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Since the dawn of history, civilized man has been concerned with foodfood for current use, for reserves in case of short crop years, for n ational
security in case of war, for internal economic and political stability, and
for adequate supplies for generations yet unborn.
Joseph and the Egyptians laid the ground work for modern farm policy
as concerns wheat. Nearly every nation has some form of governmental
program regulating the production, pricing, and trading of wheat.
It would perhaps be economically ideal if all nations, regions, and
areas produced those things for which they had a comparative ad vantage
and then freely traded their surpluses for other things they needed and
wanted. But this is not the case.
Wheat policy of exporting n ab er of m anagerial decisions to the
tions is different from wheat policy
wheat farmer?
of importing countries. Even in the
Will effective competition be
U.S. and Canada where the history
maintained within the wheat indusof wheat "problems" has been simitry in a manner which will conlar, there are differing kinds of
tinue to stimulate technological
wheat policy and programs. We
improvement?
need to examine our own domestic
Will the public welfare be safeand export wheat policies-as well
guarded against monopolistic reas those of other countries in order
strictions and special advantages
to plan for the future.
granted to one segment of agriculture or society?
Will it materially contribute to
WHEAT POLICY GOALS
"income equality for agriculture"
Wheat poli cy goals of many
-income (particularly t h a t of
countries-including the U .S.-have
wheat farm ers in this case) consistsome things in common including:
ent with the income of non-farm
safeguarding people against food
people having similar abilities,
shortages in war and peace; stabiltraining, and other resources?
izing food prices and cost of living;
·within the wheat industry itself,
conserving natural resources; foswill it create special benefi ts for
tering trade relations with other
some at the expense of others?
nations; contributing to the prosDoes it lend itself to feasible
perity and growth of the national
administra
tion?
economy; and m aximizing price
Will
the
benefits accrue to farm
and income for wheat farmers conoperators
or
be capitalized into
sistent with acceptable public costs.
land
values?
In addition we need to ask ourWhat will be the effects on rural
selves, in evaluating wheat policy
towns and communities and their
proposals, questions such as:
business and social institutions?
Will it leave an acceptable num-

vVhat effect will it have on marketing practices and institutions in
domestic and foreign trade?
Will it adapt itself to economic
production adjustments among
farms and regions?
Different people will have different answers to these and other
questions and will have varying
degrees of acceptance of any policy
which may be offered. Hence, we
may expect wheat policy-and any
other policy-to be a compromise
of that which is most acceptable
and least objectionable. Historical
perspective and political reality
suggest that progress is made slowly,
painfully, and a little at a time.

EARLY U. S. WHEAT POLICY
PROGRAMS
U.S. agricultural policy had its
beginning more than a century ago.
From the Hamilton-] efferson debates came our n a tion's declaration
for a public lands distribution policy and programs fostering a system of family farming.
For more than 100 years this
country has supported, through
state and federal aid, the policies
contributing to our present level
of productive ability. Establishment
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Land Grant University
system (with its experiment stations
and extension service operations),
and other institutional developments all have contributed to a
progressive agriculture.
Until about 1920 our policy was
beneficial to wheat farmers, to the
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economy and to trading
natwns. Then came a time when
agriculture's capacity to produce
more wheat caught up with and
passed the market demand for
wheat at acceptable prices to U.S.
producers. A new era in wheat polIcy and programs within the broad
scope of total agricultural policy
was born.
From 1909 to 1920 wheat producers (and farmers generally) had
relatively favorable incomes. \.V orld
War I touched off a demand for
wheat which outstripped capacity
to .produce. Prices rose rapidly.
Neighbors competed with each
other for more land, mortgaging
what they owned to obtain new
lands at inflated wartime prices.
The bubble burst in the early
'20s. v\T e were suddenly short on
markets and long on supplies of
wheat. Prices fell rapidly. Banks
f~iled. For wheat farmers, espeCially, the first shock wave of the
great depression to follow struck
late in 1920. The great crash of
1929 brought total business depression to this country and to the
\.V estern world.

McNary-Haugen Movement
of the '20s
~uch that was to develop in
pohcy for wheat during the next 40
years started in the early '20s. Farm
leaders turned to the government
for help in bringing about wheat
production adjustments consistent
with economic demands of the market, more orderly marketing of
wheat, and improved returns to
wheat producers.
Many of the features of the "proposed Wheat Program for 1964"
were considered in the McNaryHaugen Acts of the '20s. Similar
features included a plan for a twoprice system for wheat in the do~estic and export markets (includmg use of what was recently known
as the "wheat certificate system"),
and the encouragement of voluntary wheat supply-management.
Backed by the politically potent
"farm bloc," the McNary-Haugen
Act was twice passed by Congress,
but was vetoed by President
Coolidge both times.

GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
Beginning with the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1929, U.S. agri~ultural policy has been expressed
m a senes of laws dealing with
problems of resource use and conservation, marketing, credit, and
related problems. The central focus
?f policy has been that of improvmg farm prices and income.
Parity (the rewards ratio for resources used by agriculture in
1909-191-! in relation to resources
used elsewhere in the nation's economy) has been the symbol of economic equality. For practical purposes, ~5 to 90 percent of parity has
symbohzed economic security for
wheat farmers. Because of their
price or income focus, past agricultural programs have not adequate!~ dealt. with needed adjustments m the s1ze of the agricultural
labor force, in the amount of other
resources, in the size of farm units
and in land use changes.
'

The Federal Farm Board,
Born to Trouble
The first large scale price-support
program developed in the U.S. was
under the Agricultural Marketing
Act of 1929. That Act established a
Fede~al Farm Board "to promote
effectiVe merchandising of agricultural commodities-so that the industry of ~griculture will be placed
o~ a basis of economic equality
With other industry." It was assumed _that "effective and orderly"
mar~etmg would bring about price
and mcome equality. No provisions
were made for price supports.
The Federal Farm Board was
instructed to promote, finance, and
work_ ~ith cooperative marketing
asso_oat10ns and to investigate and
advi~e as to prevention of overproductiOn, removal of submarginal
land from cultivation, expansion of
markets at home and abroad, and
research and discovery of new uses
for farm products.
The Board was given a revolving
~und of $500 million to carry out
Its purposes .. Its work was mainly
through natwnal organizations of
marketing cooperatives on the assumption that through them farmers could sell their products in a
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much more orderly fashion, withholding wheat when prices were
lo'." and .releasing it gradually when
pnces picked up again.
The cooperatives were expected
to persuade farmers to control
~heir production and prevent serwus surpluses from arising. Vain
hope! Farmers did not reduce output. As individuals they couldn't
afford to do so. Neither the Board
nor the cooperati-ves had sanctions
they could use to effectively adjust
wheat production. Wheat surpluses
mounted. The Board made loans to
cooperatives to keep wheat off the
ma~ket and thus, hopefully, to
av01d further price declines.
A bumper wheat crop in 1929
added to the already large wheat
carryover. In the meantime a
world-wide economic depres~ion
had begun.
The Board plunged into buying
wheat already held by cooperatives
and into buying up new wheat.
Th_e Boar~ had authority to dispose
?fIts holdmgs according to its own
JUdgment. The private wheat trade
could never be quite sure what the
Board might do about selling stocks
-~ factor serving to dampen the
pnce supporting measures employed by the Board. By April,
1931, the Board's wheat holdings
exceeded 200 million bushels. Open
market wheat prices were down
drastically. The Board's money was
about gone. For practical purposes
the program was finished.
'
Hindsight indicates t h a t the
\Farm Board was born to diebt;cause it coincided with worldWide depression and colossal wheat
output at home and abroad. But it
taught man~ people something of
the compleXIty of the economics of
s~orage. Many had not fully realized that there were good chances
for heavy losses with little to gain
fr~m. trying to use storage as the
prmCipal .solution to price and
mc~me distribution problems in
agnculture.
On the plus side, it was observed
that wheat prices could have been
30 to 40 cents per bushel lower in
the Great Plains during 1930 without the Farm Board's effort. If
world economic recovery had begun
before the Board ran out of money

there is reason to believe that the
"experiment" might have been
something of a success. Instead, the
Board was expected to fight off a
deep and prolonged depression
with emergency measures inadequate for the size of the task.
Was the Farm Board program
effort a complete failure?
Did its experiences contribute
usefully to the development of policy which followed?

Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933
In contrast to the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1929, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
(AAA) was specific in its objectives as well as in measures to be
taken. Its objectives included the
establishment of such balance
between production and consumption as would restore purchasing
power for wheat, and other agricultural commodities involved, to
their 1909-1914 level.
In this act is found our first legislative definition of a "price support
norm" (or price parity) and a declaration by Congress of its policy to
reestablish parity prices as rapidly
as feasible, together with a declaration of intent not to unduly disadvantage the purchasing power of
consumers.
In its early operations commodity loans were not stressed. But
shortly following passage of the
Act, pressure for immediate and
effective price support became so
great that a Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) was created by
executive order to make non-recourse loans to farmers.
Non-recourse commodity loans
are, in effect, government purchase
contracts in which the farmer retains title or an option to buy back
within a stated period by repaying
the loan. Thus the farmer may take
advantage of any price rise from
date of loan until it is called or give
the government title to the product
in return for money advanced him.
The "loan rate" becomes a "price
support Hoor" for the commodity.
In contrast to Federal Farm
Board operations, commodity loans
made to farmers under AAA (by
CCC) depended upon farmer parti-

cipation in a production control or
adjustment program.
During the first year of AAA
( 1933-34) wheat farmers were given
" base acreages" of wheat and "a
normal yield" for each farm as a
guide for production adjustments
asked of them later should they
elect to participate in wheat production adjustment programs. In
return for reducing wheat acreage
or marketings below base allotments, farmers were to receive various kinds of benefit payments or
price guarantees.
D u r i n g 1933-35 "processing
taxes" were levied against various
commodities. Proceeds were to be
used in making benefit payments to
farmers participating in productio11
control programs. These benefit
payments represented the first use
of direct payments by government
for agriculture. The 1933 Act provided that the processing tax would
be at a rate equaling the difference
between the current average farm
price for the commodity and the
"fair exchange value of the commodity."
In 1936 the Supreme Court declared processing taxes for production control purposes unconstitutional.

ies be spent to encourage improved
resource use and conservation as
well as contributing to better price
and income positions. for farmers.
It has been said that conservation
was employed as the "gimmick" to
obtain public support for using
government money to enhance the
economic position of farmers.
Be that as it may, farmers <lid
<liven potentiai wheat lands to
grass and hay in return for the
benefits made available to them
under the 1936 Act. They also
made use of continually improving
technology and over the years
increased yields and total production while reducing acreage.
In 1938, dairymen became
alarmed over the probable impact
of more grasslands and forage. 1t
was easy to see that land diverted to
forage production might eventually
mean stepped-up dairy production.
Congress passed an amendment to
the 1936 Act which granted benefit
payments to grain farmers only on
the condition that diverted acres
not be used to produce dairy products for market.
Under circumstances extstlng
today what are the relative merits
of wheat land diversion as compared to wheat land retirement?

Soil Conservation &Domestic
Allotment Act of 1936

Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938

Following the Supreme Court's
decision against the processing tax,
Congress quickly passed the Soil
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. The Act of 1933
had concentrated upon curtailing
production, reducing surpluses, and
raising prices. The new Act of 1936
encouraged farmers to change production away from wheat and other
surplus crops and into commodities
not in surplus. Payments or benefits to wheat farmers and production adjustment were based on adequately providing for consumption
needs of people at home and
abroad, and soil conservation needs
in the national interest. The program was financed by direct appropriations.
The idea of "soil conservation"
was emphasized as a means of production control to recognize the
national concern that public mon-
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After two years of operation
under the Soil Conservation and
Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, a
new pattern of farm price support
was set up by the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938. That pattern was to be generally followed
into the early 1960's (with modifications during World War II).
Under the Act of 1938, price sup.
ports were made mandatory rather
than discretionary. The law required the AAA to support prices
o£ wheat at not less than 52 percent
nor more than 75 percent of parity.
To control supply and adjust it
to expected market demands, use of
acreage allotments was provided.
Price supports and other income
supplements were dependent upon
complying with wheat acreage allotments. In addition, penalties were
applied to all producers who over-

planted their wheat acreage allotments.
The legislation greatly expanded
CCC's loan and storage program.
Liquidation of CCC storage holdings at a cost-plus figure was authorized. This was not possible until
World \1\Tar II created a demand
for our accumulated stocks.
Appraisal of AAA effectiveness
from 1933 through 1940 indicates
that it did contribute to better
prices and incomes for wheat growers. Many of the diverted wheat
acres were transferred into production of other crops which in turn
began to create supply and demand
·imbalances for those commodities.
Actual wheat output was not reduced because higher and guaranteed prices encouraged rapid adoption of new wheat production technology. Large stocks of wheat, corn
and cotton were acquired by CCC
from 1937 to 1941.

Wartime Programs for Wheat
In May, 1941, Congress raised the
wheat loan rate to 85 percent of
parity. At that time wheat prices
in the Great Plains were approximately 70 percent of parity. The
Act was intended as a production
incentive to wheat growers to meet
wartime needs for wheat. In 1942,
Congress passed the Stabilization
Act providing that no price ceilings
on farm products be set below 110
percent of parity. A further provision was that prices were to be supported at 90 percent of parity for
2 years following the end of the
war.
Administrative regulations prevented the imposition of price ceilings on farm products without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture. This was tantamount to
"no ceilings for wheat" inasmuch
as the Secretary ruled that ceilings
could not apply to prices of farm
products at the farm or local market, but could be applied to processed farm products. Farm prices
were generally held in line with
consumer purchasing power by the
Office of Price Administration.
All limits on wheat acreages and
production were lifted in 1943.
With high support prices, new technology, favorable production

weather and insurance against
price and income cutback for a
2-year period following war's end,
the Great Plains wheat farmer
planted and harvested all-time record crops.

Post-War Dilemmas
Farmers had done a tremendous
war-time job of producing wheat
despite problems in obtaining
needed equipment, labor, etc. Per
capita farm incomes were rising
rapidly. Farmers looked upon this
as a justifiable catching up from
their past economic position.
At the end of World War II, government faced the dilemma of trying to keep its policy of stimulating
agricultural production in line
with its policy of checking inflation. In May, 1943, Congress provided for payment of subsidies to
processors and distributors of certain important cost-of-living items
including wheat. In this latter category, subsidies of one cent per loaf
of bread were started to reconcile
the policy of food a-plenty at fair
prices with the policy of providing
the wheat producer with price and
income parity.
Farm spokesmen generally disliked and fought against subsidies
of this kind, arguing that employment and wage levels were already
high enough to offset high prices
of food. They generally ignored the
possibility that further rises in farm
prices might have caused labor to
press for higher wages - which
would have been followed by rising
industrial prices and still higher
costs of production inputs for agriculture.
Farm prices for wheat h eld high
until 1949. CCC stocks of wheat
began to accumulate again as exports declined with postwar recovery abroad.

Agricultural Acts of
1948 and 1949
Before high level wartime price
supports ended, Congress concerned itself with peacetime legislation. The 1948 Act returned to the
principle of flexible price support.
It provided that support levels be
lowered whenever su pplies were
above normal consumption require4

ments (60 percent of parity if the
crop were 130 percent of normal,
or supports at 90 percent of parity
in event supplies or cr"op output
went to 70 percent of normal) .
The 1948 Act also took a step in
the direction of modernizing the
parity formula by adjusting price
rela tionships between different
farm products on the basis of the
most recent 10-year period. The
60-90 percent of parity support provisions referred to in the Act were
postponed until 1950. This left the
principles of flexibility recognized
but high, rigid price supports still
in effect.
The 1948 Act was not well received. Farmers liked the prices
they had received for several years
and were fearful of their economic
future if support levels were lowered. Their spokesmen pressed hard
for a change.
The Agricultural Act of 1949
retained the principle of flexible
price supports but with many qualifications . A price support -range of
75 to 90 percent of parity was
adopted.

Policy Since 1949
Several legislative acts passed
between 1949 and 1962 provided a
formula for computing the price
support level between 75 and 90
percent of parity, depending on
the relationship of total supplies to
normal requirements. In view of
the large surplus, support rates
would have been at the minimum
of 75 percent of parity-except that
the Korean conflict and war-related
legislation kept the formula from
becoming effective during several
years in the early 1950's.
Acreage allotments were again
established for wheat in 1950, but
during the Korean conflict acreage
restrictions were dropped. For crops
of 1955 and 1956, support was
above 75 percent of parity under
special legislation. The minimum
support level was determined and
announced prior to producer referendums. It was recomputed at the
beginning of the marketing year
(July I) and increased if required
by a change in the total supply or
in the parity price. In no case was
it lowered.
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Price support continu ed to be
extended t h r o u g h n on-recourse
loans and purchase agreements to
producers who complied with their
acreage allotment. In 1953, 1954,
and 1958. more than 40 percent of
the total wheat crop was placed
under price support, with much of
it reverting to CCC. For the 1963
crop, a diversion payment was
offered producers who voluntarily
retired a portion of their wheat
allotment to conservation uses.
Acreage allotments for wheat
have been in effect each year since
1954. Although a n ational acreage
allotment has been computed each
year under a formula in the law,
the allotment-by law-could not
be less than 55 million acres. Whenever the estimated total supply exceeded estimated requirements by
over 20 percent, a referendum was
called to determine whether marketing quotas would be imposed.
If favored by at least two-thirds
of the producers voting, marketing quotas were in effect with a
sizable cash penalty for overplanting (growers with under 15 acres
exempted). If rejected by producers, the quota provisions are suspended, but price support is provided for producers who comply
with their acreage allotment.
The minimum national allotment of 55 million acres may have
been appropriate in the late 1930's
when wheat yields averaged 15 to
16 bushels per acre. But now- with
national average yields of about 25
bushels per acre-a crop from 55
million acres almost surely results
in surplus production. The 15-acre
exemptions also added to the wheat
surplus.
Recognition that the wheat program was not effective led to a
temporary effort to reduce wheat
production in the mid-1950's by
retiring acres under the Soil Bank
program (Acreage Reserve and Conservation Reserve). Government
owned stocks of wheat were reduced
in 1957 and 1958, and wheat production-though excessive-was less
than it might have been if it were
not for the Soil Bank. The acreage
reserve phase ended with the 1958
crop year. In 1958-59 wheat stocks
rose 414 million bushels; by 1961,

stocks h ad reached 1,4 11 milli on
bushels. Congress a uthorized temporary whea t stabilization programs
for 1962 and 1963.
In 1962, acreage allotments on
individual farms were reduced by
lO percent from their allotments
based on 55 million acres. By devoting the diverted acres to approved soil conserving uses, growers earned land diversion payments.
They could also earn additional
payments by voluntarily diverting
more whea t acres to conserving
uses. The penalty r ate for exceeding the farm acreage allotment was
also increased.
For the 1963 crop, legislation
provided a voluntary land diversion
program similar to 1962, but the
lO percent mandatory diversion
was dropped.

WHAT NOW?
The Agricultural Act of 1962
revised the wheat program for 1964
and later years. The 55 million acre
minimum acreage allotment was repealed. Wheat farmers were, in
effect, told by Congress that they
could no longer expect price supports at near parity level without
effective production controls.
As before, growers could decide
by referendum w h e t h e r they
wanted this type of program or
lower support prices and less restrictions on production. A "yes"
vote would have meant stricter
controls over production and marketing. Opponents of this program
warned against increasing control
over farm production and marketing. Less than half of those voting
in the May, 1963 referendum voted
"yes."

The defeat of the two-price, diversion program left the wheat
situation "up in the air." The 1964
wheat crop will not be produced
and sold in a completely free market. Existing legislation remains in
effect until changed by Congress.
Growers who comply with acreage
allotments will be eligible for price
support at 50 percent of parity.
Those who over-plant allotments
will lose acreage history for future
programs but will not be subject to
marketing quota penalties.
5

At the time of this writing (September, 1963) the future of government wheat policy was uncertain.
Congress appeared to be in no
mood to pass new legislation. Farmers were not pressing actively for
a new program. One thing was
clear: wheat policy-and probably
agricultural policy in general-was
at a crucial point.

The Wheat Growers Dilemma
Farmers and other policy makers
recognize that the wheat problem
h as not been solved with past wheat
programs. With public costs high
and the " third market" (CCC) saturated with wheat, it is obvious
that 1 e s s wheat production is
needed. But cutting output of
wheat in the Great Plains is difficult for farmers because ( l)
equally profitable alternative crops
may not be available, and (2) support prices for wheat have been
capitalized into land values, meaning that someone stands to lose,
from reduced wheat acreages, output, and possibly lower prices.
Farmers are aware of the inequities that have arisen under administered wheat programs. These
include differences in rights to
plant or sell wheat as they have
arisen between farms, between
areas of a state and between r egions. The historical wheat base
seems unfair to many farmers and
contributes to mounting resistance
to governmental programs. In addition, many producers in the rna jor
wheat areas are discontented with
the producing and voting rights of
the "15-acre producers."
Less publicized, but of increasing
concern to the Great Plains wheat
farmer, is a growing awareness of
diminishing political influence. He
recognizes that the increasing number of urban congressmen are likely
to be less concerned than their colleagues from farm states over developing policy acceptable to wheat
producers.
Policy makers for wheat are faced
with these facts:
(1) Wheat production capacity is
still expanding with yields now a
third higher than 10 years ago, and
trending higher.

(2) Barring war or crop failure
in other countries, probability of
shon run expansion in the demand
for wheat at home or abroad is
remote.
(3) Program choices for wheat require compromise of conflicting
interests, goals, and values within
the economy.
Wishing these weren't so will
not make them go away.

Why did fann ers reject the proposed p rogram in the 1963 referendum?
Did they reject the degree of
government control over supply
management and demand expansion rather than the basic principles involved?
What lessons can be applied to
future farm legislation and program administration?

REFERENCES

T his publica tion is one of fi ve in
a series, "Whea t, People, a nd th e
Plains" prepared by the following
Agricultural Economists from the
Land Grant Colleges or Universities
of the Great Plains States: R aymond
C. Stack, Colorado; Robert J .
Bevins, Kansas ; William Ewasiuk,
Montana; Everett E. Peterson, Nebraska; Norbert A. Dorow, and
H . W . Herbison, N orth Dakota;
James R . Enix, Oklahoma; Thomas
D. Aaron, Texas; Earl Moncur,
Wyoming. E. Dean Vaughan served
as chairman of the group while an
economist at Montana State College
and continued as a consultant after
joining the staff of the Federal
Extension Service, USDA. S. Avery
Bice, associate director , Colorado,
served as administrative advisor.
Donald W. Dickson, information
specialist, FES, was editorial consul tant to the committee.

1. Manning, T. W. and Doll,
R. J., The Wheat Adjustment
Problem, Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, November, 1961.
2. Schnittker, John A., Wheat
Problems a n d Programs in the
United States, Research Bulletin
753, University of Missouri, Columbia, September, 1960.
3. ... .... ...... ...... ... .. ...., Wheat Facts,
PA-551, Agricultural Stabilization
and Conservation Service, U.S.D.A.,
Washington, D.C., January, 1963.
4. Halcrow, H. G., Agricultural
Policy of the United States, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1953.

t.i

